Breuilly, John (1985) Nationalism and the State. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
Breuilly’s perspective is that nationalism is an expression of politics and an expression of power in politics. This may connect with the definition offered by Ogot re: Anderson and Gellner, as defined by Ogot – i.e. nationalism defines nation, rather than the other way around. We’ll see.
From the concluding chapter’s Concluding Remarks section:
p. 382: “Nationalism is not the expression of nationality. . . . Nationalism is not a response to simple oppression. . . . Rather, an effective nationalism develops where it makes political sense for an opposition to the government to claim to represent the nation against the present state.”
p. 383: “. . . the ability of a political movement to insist plausibly on the existence of some fundamental cultural distinctions within a particular state can mean that the political claims of such a group automatically acquire a degree of legitimacy. New nationalist movements often fail to command sympathy not because the general form of their argument is rejected but because it is believed theat their particular case is weak. If a nationalist group does manage to persuade outsiders that there is a cultural group whose interests it represents, this can become a major political asset. On the other hand, if opponents of the movement can fix other labels upon it, such as ‘sectarian’ or ‘tribal’, this can represent a major political liability.”
Chapter 5 – Approaches to Anti-Colonial Nationalism – pages 125-139
Nationalism as an effort to end the domination of conquest by imperial outsiders. Colonial conquest is a kind of complete dominance over all spheres of life- individual and collective.
Westernization – adoption by the colonized of the very notion of Nationalism – itself a western idea. Breuilly ties education in colonial Africa to his thesis – in British West Africa there was an extensive community of well-educated colonials (think Nkrumah, et al). In French West Africa, a less sizable group, and in Belgian Central Africa a nominal group at best. Per his thesis, British colonies went after independence via nationalism routes earliest, French West Africa next, and Belgian Central Africa last. Education as a pathway to nationalist expression of the independence push. Breuilly does point out that this is a simplistic view of nationalism, Westernization, and education – as once past the surface, how much of the nationalist push was actually followed and supported by the larger, uneducated populace?
Nationalism as a breakdown in the system between Colonial power and local collaborators. Breuilly suggests that a significant piece of collaboration may actually have been controlled by the local elite who did the collaborating, rather than the colonial powers. 1898 Sierra Leone Hut Tax Revolt is cited as an example that led Britain to avoid imposing such taxes in other parts of West Africa for decades – they had offended collaborators, who worked “less efficiently” on behalf of Britain, thus weakening British exploitation of the territory.
Nationalism as arising out of resistance movements – often plural forms of resistance, with arrangements and agreements between resisting elements in colonial society. Nationalism adopts/co-opts ideas of resistance especially if resistance had become popularized.
RESISTANCE and COLLABORATION and NATIONALISM
p. 132: “The approaches emphasizing collaboration and/or resistance were developed in order to make sense of the rise of nationalism in areas such as east and central Africa. In these and other cases it was not very helpful to think in terms of westernized elites leading the movement or urban areas providing the main bases of mass support. Historians and social anthropologists who took up these lines of enquiry were concerned to penetrate the formal labels of party and ideology to the ‘real’ politics below. They were influenced by a wider trend in historical writing towards an emphasis on the contribution of those who are ruled to the making of history. Their concern with substance rather than form led them to note continuities between the pre-colonial and the colonial era. The disappointments of the first nationalist regimes in Africa and Asia suggested that independence did not break so completely with the colonial past as had sometimes been thought. All these considerations underlay the new approaches to nationalism, which could be extended to anti-colonial nationalism generally. The dangers are that they may overlook general patterns of change, emphasize the ‘substance’ of politics at the expense of the ‘forms’, and forget the simple fact that some people have far less initiative than others.”
Chapter Six – Anti-Colonial Nationalism: Two Case Studies – India and Kenya –
pages 140-166
Section on Kenyan Nationalism begins on page 151 – comments start from this point.
Kenyan nationalism as anti-colonialism arising out of opposition to the collaborator system set up by colonial authorities, and the more egregious practices of the White settlers. Largely explained here as Kikuyu and Luo.
British political control of the territory formalized in 1896 – a part of East Africa Protectorate, and 1920 with establishment of the Kenyan colony. In the intervening years, and even prior to 1896, Britain had set up local authority systems by appointing paramount chiefs, sub-chiefs, and headmen – by 1910 this would come to be known as the Native Authority system, and by 1920 the Local Native Councils would be established at district level.
Mission schools are noted as the main avenue of access to Western-style influence.
The Kikuyu are acknowledged as the most impacted of the various ethnic groups in colonial Kenya – they were the largest indigenous population; they formerly controlled the land best suited to British-style agriculture, so had that land taken away; etc.
Harry Thuku invoked as establishing formal nationalist opposition to colonialism through the Kikuyu Central Association in the early 1920s. The KCA and other groups would continue to pursue this Kikuyu nationalist agenda into the 1950s (Land and Freedom Armies being one iteration of that latter time).
East Africa not like West Africa. Colonials in West Africa were not so numerous – weather and land were not so conducive to the activities expatriated Brits sought to pursue. East Africa was this promised land. Therefore, colonial policy in east Africa sought to give little chance to locals to advance their own cause – they were educated for clerical and other support services, shunted to inferior land, and otherwise treated as though they would remain second class dwellers (not citizens) in their own homelands.
LEGCO – Legislative Council – first African nominated in 1944; first elected in 1957; expansion of African participation politics first in the post-WWII, then in the post MauMau years. Self-rule reached June 1, 1963 with Kenyatta as Prime Minister of the internal government. Full independence on December 12, 1962.
The Role of the Kikuyu
Breuilly claims the Kikuyu were not a coherent society in pre-colonial times, but a loosely knit federation of linguistically similar groups. Missionaries used Gikuyu to proselytize; colonial governments used Gikuyu to inculcate indigenous groups into the colonial mindset. Colonialism formed the Kikuyu. Collaborators certainly existed to help with these efforts – especially re: missionary and teaching work. But land alienation was – in the end – too widespread, and a popular movement against colonial forces arose that collaborators could not stop.
Oathing - out of Nairobi - consolidates popular backing for the Land and Freedom Armies (Breuilly calls them Mau Mau). Restrictions on the influence of collaborating politicians and Home Guards (the whites were loathe to cede land to local collaborators – it may, in the end, have solidified the colonial position to do so, but it wasn’t going to happen) leave them weaker than they could have been. The Emergency ensues.
Kenyatta would eventually take up a moderate stance – he did not want to lose connection to the power that some collaborators had. He also needed to remain open to collaboration with other ethnic groups, so he could not adopt any hardline Kikuyu nationalist position.
The Emergency and its aftermath, with villagization of the Kikuyu (space for collaborators to be relatively safe), and detention camps for Land and Freedom Army fighters (where an ever more intense nationalism came into being), led to a polarization of the Kikuyu.
The Role of the Luo and Luhya
Opposition to local chiefs (appointed – in many cases – by British authorities) was ever present whenever chiefs tried to extend their relative economic and politic advantage over the people. This had the effect of opening up space even in Western Kenya (where, by 1910, the railway now ran) for nationalist opposition to British colonial rule. As trade grew more reliant on easy transport, and thus privileged those with existing clout, or those who could organize trading blocs, opposition to colonial rule found ways to use trading associations to communicate.
Oginga Odinga is cited (page 160) as a Luo example of a trader (Luo Thrift and Trading Company – established in 1946) who used his connections to foment opposition. Connections extended in Nairobi, courtesy of the Company, and so political opposition was facilitated all the way into Kikuyu territory.
Odinga was elected from Nyanza to the Legislative Council (Legco) in 1957.
p. 161: “In the case of the Luo and Luhya, especially the former, opposition did not reach such intense levels as among the Kikuyu. The leading opposition figures, therefore, instead of encountering repression or apolitical reform, were able to develop their bases into the transitory institutions of the decolonization period. The problem was how the divided nationalism of the Kikuyu and the more institutionalized nationalist movement among the Luo could be coordinated to create a nationalist movement which could dominate the negotiations for independence. Kenyatta played a vital role in answering this problem.”
The Role of Jomo Kenyatta
A lifelong Kikuyu politician - Secretary-General of KCA by 1928. Arrived in Britain in 1931 and stayed for 15 years. Wrote and published Facing Mount Kenya midway through this exile. While in Britain he worked on behalf of Kikuyu interests, many relating to land ownership issues. The years between his return to Kenya (1946) and his arrest (1952) were spent largely engaged in Kikuyu politics (and the independent schools movement- what Ogot refers to as the African Schools Movement), though he had begun working to expand the membership of the Kenyan African union (KAU) beyond the Kikuyu.
Kenyatta, though a Pan-Africanist while in Britain, and amenable to pan-Africanist thought even on his return to Kenya, nevertheless was not in a position to shift Kikuyu nationalism to any greater level until well into the first years of the 1950s, and even then only to gradually expand the influence of the KAU. Pan Africanism in Kenya never really stood a chance given the Kikuyu situation, and differences between Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, and other experiences of colonialism.
Chapter Seven –Sub-nationalism in Colonial States – pages 167-184
Territorial nationalism versus cultural sub-nationalism
Territorial nationalism – think of the efforts of KAU (later KANU) in Kenya once it spread beyond the Kikuyu to include Odinga (Luo) and others – they accept the colonial boundaries, and subsequent actions move to ever-secure those boundaries within the “independent state.”
Cultural sub-nationalism (tribalism?) – any claim to autonomy coming from a group within the colonial state for its own state. The group must define itself as wholly distinct from other groups, and yet not be in a position to have a kind of primacy in a territorially integrated independent state, as breuilly’s example of the Baganda shows.
Contrast Baganda positioning with the Kikuyu split between LFA rebels and Home Guard loyalists – the Kikuyu never achieved the status of unified collaborator group that the Baganda did. Their weakness was the overt conflict. The Baganda’s weakness was their eventual isolation as Britain sought other collaborator groups.
p. 167: “One might argue [Breuilly’s code for they’d be wrong to do so?] that territorial nationalism is a practical acceptance of colonial realities and that it can only flourish given particular conditions, such as the formation of a westernized elite and institutions through which to organize at a territorial level. However, the argument might continue, such movements will always be weak because there will exist at the same time loyalties to sub-national or tribal units.”
The quote above could be used to describe life in Kenya today – even though Breuilly is arguing that the sentiment and ideas seen in the quote (written in the early 1980s) DON’T pertain. Kikuyu are again predominant in national politics, but are they in a stronger position necessarily in any kind of non-temporary way?
In his section on the Baganda, Breuilly makes it a bit clearer how ethnic identity comes to be a political identity moreso than a cultural one – people will use their ethnicity and language skills in ways that maximize their economic attainment – a straightforward politicization of identity.
The Baganda are seen by Breuilly as historically significant collaborators with the British colonial system. They had their own state and government in pre-colonial times (or at least had it at contact with missionaries – mid 19th century, and with British colonial authorities – late 1880s), but saw cooperation as a beneficial stance, rather than fighting. The Baganda helped establish British colonial control throughout non-Baganda territories in “Uganda”.
As Breuilly describes it, the situation of the Baganda are a clear example of how collaboration made for temporary strength, but contained significant weakness at the same time. Opposition, once it arose in colonial Uganda, was non-Baganda, and thus Baganda interests took a beating at independence. Obote would take away the Kabaka’s Vice Presidency with the stroke of a pen, all prior agreements going by the wayside.
Late in the colonial period, post WWII, the British had begun to see how too tight a connection to the Baganda actually weakened the colonial state – they were unable to set up effective local collaborator networks with non-Baganda. So, the Baganda began to be weakened in the colonial state, their collaborator status gradually undermined by all sides – the British rulers, the other potential ethnicized collaborator groups.
Kabaka gets deported in 1953, and the Baganda position is further weakened. Other Baganda sub-chiefs turned political attention to getting the Kabaka’s status restored, but this took away from any political integration in burgeoning independence moves, and further isolated the Baganda. Thus, the attempt in 1960, to create an independent Baganda nation, separate and distinct from the soon-to-be-independent Uganda.
Chapter Eight – The Colonial State and Nationalism – pages 186-194
Start with ideas of colonial interactions as domination or westernization or collaboration. Nationalism, as a form of response, takes economic, cultural and political forms. For nationalism to be enacted, however, it always has to take up political action.
In this introduction to this chapter, Breuilly states that a view of colonialism as domination pays “too little attention to the content of colonial politics, while the [colonialism as] collaboration approach pays too little attention to the form of colonial politics.” (186)
p. 190: “Not all opposition activity under colonial regimes can be regarded as nationalist. Nationalism had particular features. First, the focus of nationalist movements is upon taking over the state. Even effective sub-nationalist movements develop only in response to the prospect of a territorial nationalist movement taking over the state power and they claim, instead, some of that state power for themselves.”
p. 191: “Where the nationalist movement has been able to coordinate diverse elites and/or gain mass support the ideology of the movement refers to its membership and support in national terms [think Nyerere and Tanganyika here – ahh, but what, then, to make of Zanzibar, and Tanzania??]. The movement becomes an expression of colonial society as a whole. Clearly, when there is no internal nationalist challenge (as opposed to conflict with pro-colonial collaborator groups) the ideology does not need to integrate cultural identity too explicitly into its political demands. Sub-nationalist challenges or even splits in the territorial nationalist movement (for example, over federalism in Kenya) can lead to cultural identity being more strongly emphasized.”
p. 193: “Nationalism develops specialized political forms which enable it to negotiate with the colonial state: in these ways it takes on a political character appropriate to politics in a modern state. Its claims to statehood are derived from this. At the same time it invests its politics with images and idioms which enable it to claim to stand for the interests of indigenous society. in this way it seeks to preserve its hold upon indigenous society by insisting that it is not simply a modern political movement aiming to take state power. Nationalism thus always combines the incompatible concerns with modernity (in the form of statehood) and tradition (in the form of expressing the unspecialized culture of indigenous society).”
Chapter Ten – Separatist Nationalism in the New Nation States – pages 222-233
Some interesting bits about Bangladesh separatism and successful push for independence from Pakistan (and previously, India, an British colonial rule). Ditto aspects of Nigerian nationalist politics.
Same, again, for Obote politics in Uganda, followed by Amin non-politics – though the thought that Amin, because he was the Ugandan Army’s highest ranking African member at the time of independence, and because the Army was established with troops from lesser ethnic groups in colonial Uganda (the elite ethnic groups looked down on the Army as a way of life), and because the Army used Swahili for its unifying language –Amin may have been responsible for the growth of Swahili as a language within which to function in Uganda.
But the focus, for a few pages at the end of the chapter turns to Kenya and Tanganyika/Tanzania (230-231)
Breuilly mentions that the Kikuyu are often though to dominate Kenyan politics, and offers a few reasons why (government statistics on development and welfare projects are mentioned, though none cited – this is literally a section only a couple of paragraphs long).
p. 230: “one reason [the Kikuyu can’t b said to dominate] is that the struggle for independence was particularly hard in Kenya, and this helped unify elements from different ethnic groups. The cooperation between Luo and Kikuyu was particularly important, and their continued cooperation has made it difficult for other groups to mount any serious challenge. There were considerable resources to distribute once independence was achieved, which may have reduced the intensity of conflict. There were also important cross-cutting conflicts, continued after 1963. This was expressed among other things, in terms of disagreements about the treatment of members of the MauMau. The conflict has led some Kikuyu politicians to attack what they see as a conservative KANU regime based too heavily on what were loyalist groups during the colonial period. . . . “
Tanganyika is next – Breuilly cites the sheer number of ethnic groups and the likelihood that none was ever anywhere close to dominating colonial collaborator ranks, nor an independent state. Thus, coalitions were necessary from the get-go, and political organization could work on this. Swahili’s status as a lingua franca was also noted by Breuilly – its use could forestall any need to agree either upon the colonial language as the language of an independent state, or a dominant indigenous language – there was no dominant indigenous language (at least not in terms of a coherent and sizable population speaking that language –the Swahili community is numerically much too small to have controlled politics).
Finally, Breuilly mentions the political skills of Nyerere – while he notes that Kenyatta’s political skills were “a vital force for unity” in an independent Kenya, his prior descriptions of Kenyatta’s moderation and centrist stances are something Nyerere never had a need to construct or abide by.
Very interesting that Breuilly uses “Tanganyika” here (page 231), and not “Tanzania” – as if the addition of Zanzibar led to a subtraction from political unity, perhaps?
Chapter Eleven – Nation-building and Nationalism in New States – pages 234-242
Japan (19th - 20th century), Turkey (Attaturk era, post WW One), Russia (post revolution), Egypt (1920 and after, up to Sadat).
p. 240: “Mazrui has described the way teachers in east African states both in schools and at higher levels of education engage in what he ingeniously calls a process of ‘counter-selection.’ Under the heading the Eurocentric approach to history which was general in the colonial period is corrected in two ways. First, pupils study the history of their own country rather than that of Europe. Second, within this history stress is placed upon indigenous initiative rather than subjection to the will of Europeans. If possible, attention is paid to those initiatives which can be linked with the present state.”
Chapter Twelve – Unification Nationalism and the new Nation-States – pages 243-249
Pan-Africanism as a form of nationalism arising from westernization. Pan-Africanist were, by and large, educated in the West (Nkrumah, Nyerere, Kenyatta, et al). The 1945 Pan African Conference in Manchester is painted as a Caribbean, British West Africa, British east and southern Africa affair, with only two delegate from French colonial Africa (both Guinea – perhaps Toure? Seems not, as he was engaged in PITT in Guinea, and was only 23 at the time. But who, then?)
After 1945, Breuilly sees Pan-Africanism as tied pretty much to Nkrumah, as one of the leaders out of Manchester, as the most successful fighter for independence (at least as one measures achievement of political change). But as independence spread, leaders saw the need (or political advantage) to focus on their own new governments, new countries, etc. Joint action fell by the wayside, save for efforts like the Guinea-Ghana federation.
Breuilly paints Pan-Africanism as helping leaders like Nkrumah, Kenyatta, Nyerere, et al make some political hay, but as a unified political effort, it fizzled quickly.
ERRATA: page 245 – “Senghor of Guinea was prepared to make Nkrumah honorary co-president when the latter was overthrown, but this was no more than a sentimental gesture.” SENGHOR OF GUINEA?
Chapter Sixteen – the Sources and Forms of Nationalist Ideology – page 334-351
p. 342: “. . .the initial impulse behind the categorizing of many African societies as tribes can be located in European intellectual traditions. They were adapted to social reality in various ways but retained an inherent plausibility because of the small-scale nature of many African societies. They could be sustained both because their advocates had the power virtually to project their own ideas about social identity on to colonial subjects and because it suited elements in indigenous society to manipulate these categories to their own advantage. Such categories, enshrined in various forms of ‘indirect rule’, hardened and shaped much political action. In their turn they have shaped territorial national movements – both by forming part of their political material and by forcing nationalists to relate cultural diversity to the claim for territorial rather than ‘tribal’ independence.”
