Achola - 1992 - PWPA - Second Scramble for Africa

COMPREHENSIVE EXAMS -- READING NOTES

Achola, Paul P.P. W. (1992) “The sociology of knowledge and Africa’s dependency: the case of the social sciences” in Ndeti, Kivuto and Kenneth R. Gray, eds. The Second Scramble for Africa: A response & a critique analysis of the challenges facing contemporary sub-Saharan Africa. Nairobi: Professors World Peace Academy

p. 119: “Universalism [in political science terms, moral philosophy] was a paradigm for political science to the extent it permitted a decidedly laissez-faire exploration of political phenomena among practitioners who were largely agreed on this approach.”

This universalist perspective/paradigm flourished in early 19th century thinking – through into lid and late-19th century – all with pretty much NO involvement from Africa.

Legalism marked the paradigm shift in political science – focused on the STATE as the appropriate entity of study. It can be said to have arisen in the time of Machiavelli (late 14th century). It arrived in the USA in the early 19th century, but did not hold sway for all that long – Achola does not explain the why of it – could it be the federal form of government, one that split legal statuses into complex levels that don’t permit a straight state-ist view?

Achola does note that legalism held sway in Europe well into the 20th century.

p. 119: “Legalism as a paradigm focused on investigations about the nature and origin of the legally constituted state, its form or forms of government and the legal provisions governing the formal powers of the electorates, the administrators, the judiciary, and the executive branch

p. 119: “Along with European colonialism in Africa came European academic institutions and traditions. It is therefore not at all surprising that those few Africans who entered universities to study political science, received a massive dose of the institutional approach, the very essence of legalism.”

To political science theory, Achola credits America with forging the paradigm of “political realism”. GROUPS not institutions. Groups as power centers. Conflict between these groups is what drives political reality. Political reality in this context becomes/morphs into policy, as various GROUPS hold sway at various times.

Political economy would eventually slide into prominence – coming from European intellectual beginnings (Hegel, Marx, et al). Andre Gunder-Frank, Benjamin Cardoso, Celso Furtado, Frantz Fanon, Kwame Nkrumah, Walter Rodney, Amilcar Cabral – all are noted formulators of aspects of political economy in Africa.

Quoting Olewe-Nyunya, page 121: “. . . political economy models focus on elucidating the nature of social forces and their economic bases within historical context. The assumption (is) that historical and material bases of society constitute the relevant environment of political structures, political roles, political processes and the context of political, executive and judicial institutions.”

p. 121: “[Political economy] argued, along Mrxist lines, that problems confronting new states could better be understood in the context of their role as marginal actors in the predominantly capitalist international system. Domestically these states had small elite groups in control of state power which they used to enhance their socio-economic well-being and political influence. The texture of international and domestic economies shaped the direction and quality of politics. Historical and economic context of a country has more explanatory utility for political activity than conceptual or theoretical models which lay claim to universal validity.”

America came late to the political economy game – perhaps one result of being the face of global power – it takes more time for the lead actors to find reasons to focus on lesser actors, while lesser actors must - by necessity – know what the lead actor is up to.

Sociology – Comte’s positivist evolutionary paradigm comes first – human society gets more complex over the ages, as population grows, division of labor expands, specialization increases, etc. Spencer grouped the complexity into three – (1) antiquity – small societies of hunters and gatherers; (2) sedentary agriculturalists – had a more secure hold on food – a basic human need, and thus could potential spend some time engaged in non-essential pursuits, which might presumably lead to a division of labor around interests and differentiated skills; and (3) industrial societies with complex divisions of labor.

Structural-functionalism came next as a sociological paradigm – a modification of the evolutionary paradigm – Durkheim. Talcott Parsons (1940s-50s). Essentially a conservative theory, focusing on consent, order, and control, and stability. Developed without much, if any, input from Africa.

Four functions needed for society to thrive:
(1) adaptation – society must move with its environment, its economic institutions taking change in the environment into account;
(2) goal attainment – pursuit of agreed upon aims and objectives, both ideational and material;
(3) integration – management of conflict, judicial and military, as appropriate – agreed upon, a per function #2; and,
(4) pattern-maintenance – preservation of social institutions and social order in society.

Conflict paradigm – an alternative to structural-functionalism, arising out of Hegel, Marx, et al. Sought to front-line ideas of competition, conflict and change – ideas that structural functionalism buried. Achola points out that the conflict paradigm has its home in Europe, and got very little foothold in African sociological circles.

Micro-sociology – the first micro-focused paradigm – looks at individuals in social context, and the subjective meanings individuals attach to what they do, their behavior. George Herbert Mead espoused this view (1863-1931). Symbolic interactionism is perhaps the most prominent “school” of micro-sociological thought.

p. 124: “European (and late American) intellectual ideas were spread in Africa through schools. While cultural domination through the church was more subtle, cultural domination through schools was direct and almost ludicrous. In the later stages of colonial rule in Africa, a few university (or university-level) institutions were established by colonial authorities. . . . .

By the 1950s and early 1960s, these colonially imported institutions in Africa had become the leading theatres of European cultural penetration. These institutions served as the main conduits through which European intellectual traditions in political science and sociology were imparted among Africans. For many years those university institutions were almost exclusively staffed by European scholars. Naturally, thee scholars propagated a cosmic view that was strongly Eurocentric.

As disciplines that deal with human values and belief systems, both political science and sociology as taught in institutions of higher learning were tainted with European modes of thought.”

Achola cites Edward Berman’s writings on Africa, post-WWII Americna hegemony and the interests of major foundations:
p. 125: “One strategy used by these foundations was the creation of lead universities in African countries regarded as strategic to the United States. In line with this strategy, Foundation personnel identified viable existing institutions with some competent local staff and with government support and elevated them to the status of universities. Foundation personnel in the field offices and in the United States became heavily involved in the overall planning and implementation of university policies. . .

In summing up this strategy of American foundations, Berman concludes (1979:159):

. . . the Ford Foundation’s most significant post-secondary educational undertakings were in Nigeria, Ethiopia, Congo/Zaire, and in a combined university scheme linking the East African nations of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. Rockefeller funds were concentrated on an East African inter-territorial scheme, in Nigeria, and more recently Zaire.”

In a more focused, smaller-scale sense, foundations also concentrated energy on establishing social science departments in various institutions. This often took the form of placing established American or European scholars/academics in institutions to “help establish” departments, and bringing selected young African scholars to Europe or North America for studies.

Finally, Achola talks about the use of textbooks in university settings – nearly all, especially in the earliest years of [westernized] university study in Africa, written in English, French, or relevant colonial language. Nearly all written from Euro-American politically perspectives, through Euro-American intellectual lenses.

African academics are – as a body of people – among the most completely Westernized of any collection/grouping of people from the continent.

p. 127: “It is quite tempting to take the easy option of preserving the status quo by arguing that the problems which perpetuate Africa’s intellectual dependency are insurmountable. It is equally tempting to take the other extreme position of advocating for the severance of links with the West. I find both positions unacceptable: the first because it is culturally and psychologically debilitating and suicidal; and the second because of its blindness to the fact that the West is a stubborn reality Africa must live with. It therefore remains a central thesis of this paper that to survive as a distinct and dignified race, Africans must revitalize their culture, evolve and internationalize their particular brand of social science scholarship.”

p. 127; “The universities, because they hold the highest concentration of African scholars and intellectuals, have a leading role to play in the continent’s cultural renewal and growth. But the universities must indicate a genuine interest in this process by remaining open to the influence of local communities as much as the latter remain receptive to the universities (Mazrui, 1975:206).”